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Through a case study of the Obihaka 
plantation, this article examines the 
possibility of PNG landowner groups 
rehabilitating run-down coffee plantations 
through the use of ‘sweat equity’ and other 
in-kind and cash contributions.
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At least three major problems afflict the 
PNG coffee industry. This article describes, 
by way of a case study, a possible solution to 
them. The first problem relates to the many 
former plantations owned and managed 
by expatriates, which were returned to the 
customary landowners during the 1970s and 
1980s under the Plantation Redistribution 
Scheme or were abandoned by their 
expatriate owners as being uneconomical or 
too difficult to work. When the plantations 
were operating successfully, they were 
producers of premium-quality coffee, 
which was sought by international coffee 
connoisseurs (Stapleton 1997, 2002a). 
Poor rural infrastructure, lack of credit, 
a breakdown in law and order, lack of 
community support and increasing costs 
(Eko 2002; Taru 1997), combined with 
pressure from the surrounding customary 
landowning groups to take back control 
of the land their ancestors had sold, 
severely constrained the plantation sector. 
When landowning groups received back 
the plantations under the Plantation 
Redistribution Scheme and attempted to 
run them as businesses, poor financial and 
asset management and dishonesty resulted 
in many plantations failing financially and 
leaving behind large debts to banks and 
local businesses. This land, the coffee trees 
and the infrastructure are presently lying 
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largely unused. Moreover, the economies 
of scale offered by the plantation mode of 
management are being forgone. Clearly, 
attempting to bring back expatriate 
managers is out of the question; therefore, 
some means of enabling the former owners 
of the land to manage and operate the 
plantations needs to be found.
The second problem in the PNG 
coffee industry relates to the necessary 
improvement in the quality of the coffee 
produced by the thousands of smallholders 
who occupy the former plantations and the 
land that surrounds them, which remains in 
customary tenure. When production from 
the plantations declined, the average quality 
of PNG coffee also declined. The former 
customary landowners have occupied many 
plantations and smallholder households 
(who are not overly concerned about 
quality) produce most of the coffee. The 
poor quality of PNG coffee results in poor 
prices and a general downgrading of PNG 
coffee in international markets. The poor 
quality is caused by unselective picking 
and delayed pulping, fermentation and 
drying. Many of these problems could be 
resolved by taking the processing out of 
the hands of smallholders and moving it 
to larger facilities, such as those found at 
the plantations. In addition, a means needs 
to be found to take extension messages 
effectively and efficiently to the thousands 
of smallholder coffee producers to show 
them why quality is important and how to 
achieve it.
The third problem relates to what 
Hughes (2004) and Gosarevski et al. (2004) 
call ‘communal’ ownership of land and 
resources, which they assert holds back 
economic growth in rural Papua New 
Guinea. The development of coffee growing 
in Papua New Guinea is not, however, being 
held back by so-called communal ownership 
of land but by the ownership by thousands 
of individual households of hundreds of 
small blocks of coffee. Hughes and others 
argue that the owners should be able to sell 
their small blocks to the hardest-working, 
most innovative individuals in order for 
economies of scale and investment to occur. 
What the smallholder farmers are supposed 
to do once they have sold their land is not 
clear. In the case of the former plantations, 
however, the land has already been sold and 
has been removed from customary title. The 
former owners—as incorporated groups or as 
company shareholders—now have title to a 
relatively large area of land planted to coffee 
in which they can invest and from which they 
can extract economies of scale, if the means 
can be found to enable them to manage the 
land effectively and the community that has 
an interest in the land.
While there is possibly some truth in 
what Hughes and others assert, they appear 
not to understand the scale of the unrest that 
could be unleashed if the ‘community’ is 
ignored or if an attempt is made to rapidly 
individualise title to customary land. PNG 
villagers continually stress the importance 
of the community, even if it is not always 
clear what is meant by the term. In the 
absence of any inherited authority—and, 
in the past, the absence of any outside 
authority able to enforce the law, a situation 
in many ways similar to the present one—
men, in particular, are highly conscious of 
the danger to peaceful coexistence caused 
by the jealousies engendered by inequitable 
access to resources that are seen to belong 
to everyone. Failure to manage inequities 
satisfactorily can lead to sabotage of 
infrastructure, theft, physical violence and 
sorcery. The ambitious, hardworking people 
espoused by Hughes and others have to 
ensure that the community also benefits 
from their personal success. The failure of 
expatriate plantation owners to distribute 
to the community some of the benefits 
accruing to them from the use of what was 
seen as community land was an important 
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cause of the desire to take back the land and 
was seen as justifying the theft of coffee and 
other assets from the plantations.
This paper describes the rehabilitation 
of a run-down plantation at Obihaka in the 
Asaro Valley, 30 kilometres west of Goroka 
in Eastern Highlands Province. Obihaka is 
a 65 hectare plantation situated 1,750 metres 
above sea level. The area is the home of the 
famous Asaro Mudmen, who live in villages 
surrounding the estate. Many aspects of the 
study can be related to the three problems 
already mentioned. The case-study is 
presented, then the problems raised above 
are revisited in the discussion.
Obihaka plantation
Former gold-miner Joe Searson established 
Obihaka in the 1950s on three blocks of coffee 
(Sinclair 1995). In 1963 Jim Leahy, owner of 
Highlands Produce Buyers, purchased 
Obihaka Estate and his nephew Paddy 
Leahy became manager and expanded the 
area of coffee. Obihaka became renowned 
for the quality of the coffee it produced 
(Sinclair 1995:339). The plantation became 
part of the Collins and Leahy Group but in 
1993 it was sold to Gorokan businessman 
Apere Goso, the owner of Alenumpa Coffee 
Pty Ltd. Goso was not a local landowner 
and, after the sale, the landowners began 
stealing the coffee cherries and harassing 
plantation employees.
People from Kenetisaro and Komunive 
villages and other villages surrounding the 
estate established a company known as Kora 
97. In 1998, Kora 97 purchased 60 per cent 
of the shares in Alenumpa Coffee Pty Ltd. 
After majority ownership was transferred 
to the Obihaka landowners—incorporated 
as Kora 97—the company engaged the 
services of several management agencies, 
but none of them were successful. The board 
of directors of Obihaka also appointed 
managers from within the landowning 
group but they ran the estate into debt. As 
a result, the landowners lost confidence in 
their company.
The main management issues that 
led to Obihaka running into problems 
were that the appointed managers lacked 
business skills and failed to control costs. 
They ran down the operating capital until 
the plantation could no longer pay for 
its operations. The managers also lacked 
technical expertise; they abused and 
mismanaged company assets, vehicles in 
particular. The members of the board were 
mostly villagers and they lacked the skills 
and knowledge to monitor the performance 
of the managers effectively. When the 
shareholders realised that benefits in the 
form of dividends were not forthcoming 
from the company as expected, they again 
resorted to cherry stealing and theft of 
company assets. General lawlessness 
increased in the community and further 
disrupted the operations of the plantation.
The PNG Coffee Industry Corporation 
(CIC) first became involved with Obihaka 
in 2001. The CIC arranged for two Obihaka 
managers to attend a 2002 plantation-
management skills  training course 
conducted jointly by the CIC and the 
Smallholder Support Service Pilot Project. 
These two men were trained specifically 
to facilitate the rehabilitation of Obihaka; 
however, for reasons unknown, this did 
not happen.
In April 2005, the CIC made a second 
approach to Obihaka and the board 
decided unanimously to rehabilitate the 
plantation with assistance from the CIC. The 
landowners wanted to revive the plantation 
for two main reasons. They understood that 
the wealth that the plantation had generated 
for its European owners had not been 
realised after the customary landowners 
had taken it over. At meetings and in 
group discussions, the shareholders said 
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they wanted the plantation to contribute 
to the economic and social development 
of the local community. They realised that 
after the failure of Kora 97 they could not 
again seek investment from outside and 
they wanted to use local resources so that 
external assistance was minimal and to 
create job opportunities. To show good 
faith, the shareholders from Komunive 
and Kenetisaro villages started cutting 
grass on the plantation on Mondays and 
Thursdays each week. This was followed by 
the spraying of regrowth using purchased 
herbicides and with in-kind contributions 
from members of the community.
Between 2001 and 2005, the CIC changed 
its extension methods from a training 
and visit approach to group training 
(CIC 2002). The new approach required 
more participation from the villagers and 
involved them directly in making decisions 
that affected the management of the 
plantation (van Veldhuizen et al. 2003). The 
participating group members were involved 
in decision making and implementation so 
that they accepted responsibility for the 
ownership of the company (Hunt 2001). The 
CIC began a monthly audit of activities on 
the plantation. Most of the rehabilitation 
activities were documented and they 
included keeping records of expenditure, 
income from cash contributions and income 
from cherry sales, plantation expenses and 
other expenses related to social activities in 
the community. These records formed the 
basis of financial reports to the shareholders. 
The CIC provided advice at meetings and 
through written advisory notes, particularly 
to the interim managers of the plantation.
The CIC held three types of meetings 
at Obihaka. Meetings were held with the 
board of directors to advise them about how 
to manage the company and the roles and 
responsibilities of directors. Meetings with 
the interim managers dealt with specific 
management issues, raised by either the 
CIC or the managers. Shareholder meetings 
were used to persuade the shareholders to 
view the plantation as a resource that would 
generate income, but which was presently 
wasting away. They were encouraged to live 
productive lives by working the land. The 
frequency of meetings depended, however, 
on the availability of CIC vehicles to travel 
to Obihaka. From April 2005 to June 2006, 
monthly trips were made to the project site. 
In July 2006, travel was restricted to once 
every two months and later to once every 
three months.
Rejuvenating the company
The rehabilitation process comprised two 
parts: the reorganisation of the company 
and the physical rehabilitation of the 
plantation. At an informal meeting in 
April 2005, the board and elders from the 
community discussed the advantages and 
disadvantages of getting the plantation up 
and running. They decided that they would 
mobilise their communities to rehabilitate 
the estate. The directors and shareholders 
agreed that transparency and accountability 
had been lacking in the past, resulting in 
the collapse of the company. They believed 
that the mistakes of the past had, however, 
taught them lessons and they therefore 
made changes in the financial management 
of the plantation to try to prevent such 
mistakes in the future.
The project leaders decided to register 
a company to operate the plantation and 
to diversify into other income-generating 
activities if the opportunity arose. The 
registration of the company was achieved in 
September 2006. A constitution and policies 
to guide the operation of the company are 
being prepared and a management structure 
consistent with the company’s constitution 
and policies is also being developed. The 
structure includes a ‘community working 
committee’ that will attend to social issues 
in the community. This committee will 
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bank agreed to schedules for the repayment 
of bad debts from the Kora 97 failure 
in order to re-establish a good business 
name and to reverse the negative attitudes 
held by the local business community. 
The company expected to open a cheque 
account in February 2007 and deposit all 
income into the account, which would 
make transactions easier and improve 
record keeping and financial control 
significantly.
The company had no operating funds 
during the early period of rehabilitation. 
Operational expenses were paid from 
collections taken up among shareholders 
and ‘sweat equity’, in which shareholders 
and others who could not make cash 
contributions laboured on the plantation 
for no pay but received credits in the form 
of shares. Labour was converted into cash 
values using the ‘rural minimum wage’ 
rates of K74.40 a fortnight or K7.44 for an 
eight-hour day. The total investment from 
April 2005 to June 2006 was K5,175.45 (Table 
1). The cash contributions amounted to 
almost K1,000 and were used to purchase 
herbicides, knapsack sprays and empty 
drums to be used for storing and mixing 
chemicals. Some people provided in-
kind contributions, such as food for the 
shareholders working on the plantation. 
These in-kind contributions were valued 
at K2,400. The sweat equity labour and 
the Obihaka landowners’ investment 
were critical because they created a sense 
of ownership of the company and the 
plantation. Money was also borrowed from 
community members, particularly to pay 
coffee pickers and to purchase herbicides. 
Some of these loans have been repaid 
while others are waiting until the financial 
situation of the plantation improves. The 
interim managers of Obihaka approached 
local coffee buyers, businessmen, exporters 
and banks for financial assistance in the 
form of loans but all refused. 
ensure that demands by the shareholders for 
financial contributions to social activities do 
not interfere with the day-to-day business 
operations of the plantation. Many of the 
positions in the company are not presently 
filled but will be when the financial state of 
the plantation improves.
In 2002, the shareholders registered 
as a business group with the Investment 
Promotion Authority (IPA). The business 
group registration expired in June 2006. 
With the appointment of new directors, 
however, the local commerce office in 
Goroka was approached to register Obihaka 
as a company with a shareholding business 
group so that it would be able to diversify 
into business activities in addition to coffee. 
Applications for company incorporation 
and business registration were lodged. 
Questions raised by the IPA were answered 
satisfactorily and Obihaka was issued 
company incorporation and business 
certificates in October 2006. The IPA issued 
three certificates: for Keko Investments 
Limited as the parent company and for the 
two shareholding groups, Keko Business 
Group and Mukimuki Business Group. 
The Keko Business Group is made up of 
shareholders from Komunive and Kenetisaro 
villages, including the ‘sweat equity’ 
investors. The Mukimuki Business Group 
comprises shareholders from neighbouring 
villages in the Asaro Valley. 
A major difficulty encountered was the 
inability to open a bank account. The banks 
have stringent guidelines for opening new 
accounts and would not allow the former 
company to open new accounts with the 
new company directors as signatories. 
This made the management of cash very 
difficult. Because all transactions had to be 
handled as cash, control over expenditure 
was not as good as it should have been. 
After almost a year, the bank agreed to 
the plantation opening an account in the 
first quarter of 2007. The company and the 
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From April 2005 to September 2006, 
the rehabilitated trees produced almost 
37 tonnes of cherry coffee, which was sold 
for K33,000. About 30 hectares—just less 
than half of the plantation area—was able 
to produce coffee. The coffee was sold as 
cherries because no facility existed to process 
the coffee to parchment or green bean. 
Apart from the small amount contributed 
by landowners, no other sources of income 
were available. The income was used to 
begin paying off debts from the earlier 
financial collapse of the plantation. Other 
payments were made to people from the local 
community who had occupied plantation 
land, to compensate them for moving off 
the land. Part of the income was also used 
to purchase herbicides and tools and to hire 
vehicles to transport materials and to cart 
water for herbicide mixing. This part of the 
income (Table 2) was put back into the estate 
to continue the rehabilitation work.
Table 1  Monetary value of cash and in-kind contributions, including sweat equity, 
April 2005 to June 2006
Activity Contribution (kina)
Labour input (5,556 man hours at 0.93 toea/hour) 5,175.45 
Cash contributions 925.00 
In-kind shareholder support 2,400.00 
Tools and equipment 2,000.00
Total 10,500.00
Source: Sengere, R. and Susuke, W., 2006. Using sweat equity to rehabilitate coffee plantation: a case study on a 
group rehabilitating Obihaka plantation in Daulo, EHP, RGSD, Coffee Industry Corporation, Goroka.
Table 2  Coffee production, income and expenses, November 2005 to September 2006
Month Cherries (kg) Income (kina) Expenses (kina) Surplus/deficit (kina)
November 2,237 1,939.90 1,940.20 –0.30 
December 1,748 1,223.60 1,164.40 59.20 
January 1,286 1,286.00 1,237.00 49.00 
February 1,159 1,159.00 1,163.80 –4.80 
March 10,419 7,854.40 7,565.20 289.20 
April 3,331 2,900.75 1,946.80 953.95 
May 888 780.00 779.00 1.00 
June 6,022 5,279.40 4,285.20 994.20 
July 819 1,237.00 1,236.40 0.60 
August 8,671 8,513.10 4,161.40 4,353.70 
September 1,043 1,438.40 5,445.70 –4,007.40
Total 37,623 33,111.55 30,925.51 3,228.85 
Source: Sengere, R. and Susuke, W., 2006. Using sweat equity to rehabilitate coffee plantation: a case study on a 
group rehabilitating Obihaka plantation in Daulo, EHP, RGSD, Coffee Industry Corporation, Goroka.
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It is expected that pests and diseases will 
pose problems in the future as production 
increases.
Because of the financial constraints, 
shareholders are concentrating on 
rehabilitation and have not proceeded to 
further development. When the financial 
situation improves, they will develop 
three aspects of the plantation. First, a 
nursery is required to provide seedlings 
for replanting areas where coffee trees have 
died. Seedlings are also needed for the 
planned planting of previously unplanted 
areas. Landowners who established 
houses and gardens within the plantation 
boundaries during the period of failed 
management have agreed to relocate 
and free up this land for expansion and 
further development. Second, the estate 
requires a pig-proof fence around the entire 
boundary. Third, a reliable water supply 
is required to assist in the rehabilitation 
program. Presently, the shareholders dig 
waterholes in the nearby gullies and cart 
the water 200–300 metres to mix with 
herbicides. This remains the heaviest work 
undertaken in the past 18 months. Workers 
fill and carry 200-litre drums during one 
day and spraying is carried out the next 
day, as water carrying is very tiring.
The plantation can be a focus for the 
delivery of other services as well as those 
offered by the CIC, including visits by 
health and HIV/AIDS-awareness teams. 
The CIC has begun networking with other 
agencies and organisations such as the 
provincial departments of primary industry, 
World Vision, Community Development 
Services, AusAID, the European Union and 
the United Nations Development Project 
to help the CIC make the best use of the 
limited resources at its disposal. There are 
several projects under way through such 
arrangements at other CIC project sites.
Rehabilitating the plantation
The three major components of the 
rejuvenation of the plantation are the 
rehabilitation of the coffee trees, pest and 
disease reduction and the development of 
further business activities such as coffee 
processing. Tools and equipment—for 
example, knapsacks, protective clothing, 
bush knives, secateurs and spades—could not 
be purchased because the group had no cash 
reserves. The shareholders therefore used 
their own tools to assist the rehabilitation 
effort. The critical areas identified as part 
of the rehabilitation process to ensure the 
plantation operated productively were grass 
and weed control by hand cutting and the 
use of herbicides and coffee-tree pruning. 
Grass had grown over the coffee trees, 
suppressing production and killing some 
trees. So far 85 per cent of the plantation 
has been cleared of tall weeds. Appropriate 
herbicides—especially Glyphosate and 
Gramoxone—were purchased and used in 
spraying regrowth. Because many of the 
trees were weak after the clearing, coffee-
tree pruning was delayed. Some trees have 
now recovered and maintenance pruning 
is being carried out. Coffee trees that died 
from prolonged neglect will be replaced 
with typica and arusha coffee varieties, 
which have performed well in the prevailing 
agronomic and climatic conditions. Shade 
trees such as albizzia (Albizzia stipulata) 
and yar (Casuarina oligodon) will be planted 
in areas devoid of shade to improve 
the sustainability of coffee production 
and reduce the need for fertilisers. The 
shareholders have a long-term plan to 
operate a wet and dry coffee-processing 
facility to process coffee to green bean on 
the farm and obtain premium prices. Pests 
and diseases are not a major issue but pink 
disease (Phanerochaete salmonicolor) has been 
noticed in areas where there is heavy shade. 
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Discussion
A downward trend in coffee production 
has occurred since the 1980s in the large-
holding sector (Bourke 2005; Hughes 2004; 
Stapleton 2002a, 1997). It is very important 
for the government and its agencies, such 
as the CIC, to devise appropriate ways to 
rehabilitate this important sub-sector of 
the coffee industry—once the main source 
of high-quality coffee exports. Few of the 
plantations that came back into the hands 
of customary landowning groups in the 
1970s are economically viable. In the 1980s, 
the government introduced 20 hectare 
coffee-block development projects to allow 
landowning and family groups to develop 
coffee blocks on their customary land. The 
majority of these blocks are also struggling 
to survive. 
In most cases, when plantations moved 
back into the hands of the landowners, 
management problems, poor accountability 
and abuse of assets occurred (Eko 2002; Taru 
1997). The inability of the managers to prepare 
transparent and understandable reports 
led to scepticism among the shareholders. 
Moreover, the shareholders did not receive 
cash benefits from the plantations as they 
were told they would when ownership was 
transferred. Consequently, many tried to 
derive a benefit by stealing cherry coffee 
and selling it to itinerant coffee buyers. 
Criminal activities such as stealing cash 
and hijacking equipment and transport as 
well as general law and order problems 
significantly increased costs on the 
plantations. Deteriorating roads and bridges 
in rural areas have had a severe adverse 
impact on the managed sub-sector, as well 
as on smallholders (Ketan 2007; Fleming 
and Antony 1993). Service agencies such as 
the CIC and the police and coffee buyers are 
not able to reach the coffee plantations and 
the plantations and smallholders cannot get 
their coffee to market.
If policymakers had thought more 
carefully about the transfer process and 
proper checks and balances had been put 
in place to guide operations, many of these 
problems could have been avoided. As 
a result of this chaos, banks and lending 
institutions had many bad experiences 
with the managed sub-sector. They do not 
intend to risk further investments in an 
environment in which the risks of failure 
are so high (Eko 2002; Fleming 2002).
A number of writers (Eko 2002; Stapleton 
2002b) have blamed the government for not 
paying sufficient attention to the managed-
coffee sub-sector. Labour is readily available 
in rural areas and millions of coffee trees 
are available to be rehabilitated. Coffee is 
also available to be harvested. The question 
is how can the existing labour supply be 
used to manage the trees, harvest them 
properly and sell the crop as high-quality 
coffee? One possibility is to harness the 
resources of customary landowning groups 
as shareholders in the plantation companies 
that were set up 20 years ago, and use their 
labour as sweat equity as well as their in-
kind contributions and cash to rehabilitate 
the run-down plantations (Sengere and 
Susuke 2006).
Sweat-equity investment is made 
through the labour of the shareholders. 
Hardaker and Fleming (1994) argue that 
when developing agricultural policies, 
strategists should make the best use of the 
resources available in the agriculture sector. 
In this model, the shareholders supply 
labour, small amounts of capital, equipment 
and tools to the company. Assistance from 
sources outside the group is minimal. Once 
the plantation begins to generate an income, 
inputs such as fertilisers and chemicals can 
be purchased.
Sweat equity was a central concept 
behind the establishment of the 20 hectare 
blocks. The labour of the family or the 
landowning group was to be used as an 
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authority and status. Individuals cannot 
be forced against their will to do things on 
their own land. Holding people together and 
getting them to work towards a single goal 
can be extremely difficult. An anthropologist 
working in early colonial Chimbu labelled 
that society anarchical (Brown 1963). The film 
Ongka’s Big Moka illustrates the efforts that a 
leader had to make a successful pig exchange 
(moka) in the Western Highlands. Ongka 
(who had no traditional authority over his 
fellow tribesmen) had to use the force of 
his personality, his persuasiveness and his 
considerable organisational ability to bring 
his tribesmen with him and he was almost 
exhausted before the exchange occurred.
Landowning groups in Papua New 
Guinea cannot be ignored or wished away. 
They act as cohesive groups, as Ongka’s 
group eventually did, because if they do 
not meet social obligations such as bride-
price payments, funerals and feasts, they are 
shamed. These groups are led by ‘big-men’, 
who live similar lifestyles to the others in 
the group, but whose drive, intelligence 
and charisma attracts and stimulates people 
to work towards a common goal. The big-
men become renowned by being a focus for 
wealth and for redistributing wealth—not 
for accumulating it (Gregory 1982). Bride-
price payments, funerals and feasts still 
cause people within the group to work 
together; similar methods need to be brought 
into the modern business environment. 
Conversely, group members are angered 
if one person amasses wealth from what 
are clearly the group’s resources. People 
expect profits derived from group resources 
to be shared equally. The principles of 
customary relations should be examined so 
that appropriate leadership qualities can be 
identified among the group members. Those 
who possess good attributes must lead 
the group with honesty and transparency, 
thus gaining the support of the wider 
community.
investment; however, management agencies 
paid to advise the coffee-block owners 
became involved in unscrupulous activities 
and trust with the landowners was lost 
(Lakau 1994). Twenty-hectare blocks owned 
by individuals or managed by a single 
family group and not by a landowning 
group have, however, been successful. It 
is not, however, normally possible for a 
single family to gain ownership of a large 
plantation because these plantations are on 
lands previously owned by a landowning 
group; other members of the group will not 
stand by and see all the land going to one 
family or individual.
The principle of sweat equity used in the 
original 20 hectare block development needs 
to be applied to the run-down plantations, 
but the sweat equity and in-kind and cash 
investors must be rewarded properly—for 
example, by making shares available that 
will pay dividends when the enterprise 
makes a profit. Good management and 
proper record keeping is therefore critical.
There is a great deal of experience in Papua 
New Guinea of what does not work when 
rural landowning groups become involved 
in commercial activities. The experiences of 
the former cooperative societies were dismal 
(Dakeyne 1966). Many of them failed due to 
financial mismanagement and abuse of assets 
(Stapleton 2002b; McSwain 1970); however, 
their experience could provide lessons 
that can be applied to the present situation 
(Fleming 2002). Pre-colonial administrators 
initiated the cooperative movement as early 
as the 1940s, especially in the coastal areas 
of Papua New Guinea (Singh 1974; Dakeyne 
1966). Those promoting the cooperative 
movement possibly misunderstood the 
nature of PNG society. Rather than being 
made up of large groups of people who 
cooperate willingly, PNG ‘communities’ 
comprise groups of people related largely 
by kinship who are in competition with 
other groups and with each other for power, 
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PNG cooperatives appear to have 
failed for a number of reasons. Indigenous 
managers lacked the ability to cope with 
simple business procedures and financial 
incompetence and malpractice created 
doubts and scepticism among members 
(McSwain 1970). Cooperatives generally 
could not compete with private enterprise. 
Cooperatives required members to sell their 
produce only to the cooperative. Expatriate 
businessmen commonly paid higher prices 
than the cooperative could. As a result of 
the failure of cooperatives, the government 
promoted incorporated business groups—a 
form of business organisation new to Papua 
New Guinea (Mugambwa 2005). When left 
unsupervised, however, the incorporated 
business groups ran into the same financial 
problems as the cooperatives had. Close 
supervision of business practices—
especially controlling spending and cash 
flow—will be required for a number of 
years after the establishment of a business 
group or company. The Obihaka and other 
business groups have had major problems 
controlling cash flow. For this reason, 
managers of plantations must be trained 
in simple book-keeping and accounting. 
To improve accountability, a state agent or 
its nominee should be a signatory on bank 
accounts.
Monitoring is required as the managers 
of landowning groups lack the skills and 
knowledge to manage financial and field 
operations adequately. Authorities must 
therefore develop appropriate strategies to 
ensure that the performance of plantations 
and blocks is monitored closely. The 
evaluation of performance through regular 
audits is critical to identify the position 
of the group and to enable appropriate 
advice to be provided. Managers should be 
required to provide monthly and quarterly 
reports for auditing purposes.
Resources in the possession of the 
landowners should be assessed before 
external assistance is sought. Furthermore, 
relevant state agencies such as the CIC, the 
local commerce office and the provincial 
DPI should be obliged to ensure that the 
management of landowning companies is 
complying with the advice given and that 
they are fulfilling management requirements 
before they are considered for external 
assistance. These criteria can include formal 
company registration, a constitution and an 
appropriate company structure to guide the 
company.
The plantation as a centre of rural 
development 
The experiences of Obihaka might be 
an intermediate step towards a ‘rural 
revolution’ in Papua New Guinea, especially 
in the Central Highlands where coffee is the 
major source of income as well as promoting 
spin-off economic activities. To go directly 
from the present smallholder customary 
tenure to individual tenure would cause 
a fierce reaction, as with the reaction in 
1999 to the World Bank’s proposals. The 
Obihaka case demonstrates a possible step-
by-step process, a first step away from the 
incorrectly named ‘communalism’ to an 
eventual diversification of economic activity 
in rural areas.
The Obihaka case is different from 
the cooperatives in which members all 
held one share. It is a company in which 
former landowners hold many shares and 
individuals can earn additional shares 
by working harder; shareholders receive 
dividends, directors can be held accountable 
to the law under the Companies Act, 
accounts must be properly audited, the 
company holds clear title to the plantation 
land because it has been alienated and 
plantations can employ local youths and act 
as centres for coffee extension. Plantations 
can also act as centres for other community 
extension work such as health and HIV/
AIDS awareness programs.
The  rehabiliTaTion  of  coffee  planTaTions  in  papua  new  Guinea
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Importantly, a number of communal 
business groups in Papua New Guinea 
have set up education funds that pay the 
school and university fees for children of 
their members. As these children become 
educated vocationally or professionally, they 
can return to their home area and offer their 
services to the local community as carpenters, 
motor mechanics, plumbers, electricians or 
dressmakers, while others could similarly 
offer services as accountants, business 
managers, lawyers and health professionals. 
In the long term, it will be very important for 
the children of today’s smallholders to be able 
to earn their living off the ‘farm’, but without 
migrating to urban areas.
The plantation as a ‘nucleus estate’
Coffee quality has fallen in Papua New 
Guinea. Quality is almost the only way 
that Papua New Guinea can compete 
in the international coffee market and 
plantations such as Obihaka could act 
as a centre of high-quality production. 
Obihaka was once a producer of prime-
quality green bean coffee and earned 
premium prices. It also had a reputation 
for exporting directly to Europe. Obihaka 
has the potential to become a ‘nucleus 
estate’—to produce high-quality coffee 
in its own right and provide support to 
surrounding coffee-growing smallholders. 
The shareholders of Obihaka are the 
smallholder coffee farmers. By working 
on the plantation, which has received 
high-quality advice from organisations 
such as the CIC, smallholders will gain 
knowledge of the latest recommendations 
for growing coffee and see the outcomes 
of the recommendations on the plantation. 
The plantation could also buy cherry 
from the surrounding smallholders and 
process it properly, increasing the quantity 
and quality of coffee. Through economies 
of scale in purchasing farm inputs, the 
plantation could also provide cheaper farm 
chemicals and tools to its shareholders.
Conclusion
The principles used in rehabilitating 
Obihaka plantation have the potential to 
be replicated in other run-down plantations 
and rural blocks. This ailing sector of the 
economy could also help to restore the 
high quality of PNG coffee. It should be 
the role of state agencies such as the CIC to 
ensure that group-owned companies adhere 
to sound business practices. Most of the 
plantations could contribute significantly 
to the advancement of the local, regional 
and national economies if they are given 
the necessary support through the provision 
of appropriate services. Moribund local 
business groups often hold clear title to 
plantation land and coffee trees. 
At Obihaka, landowners decided to 
use their own resources, savings, earnings 
from their own coffee production and 
their ‘sweat’ to get the plantation back into 
production. They are using income from 
this production to pay off old debts, and so 
regain the confidence of the local business 
community. As owners of the company, the 
Obihaka people remain concerned about 
providing services to the community—for 
example, in the form of subsidising the cost 
of education for local children. In the long 
term, this could have significant benefits for 
the community. The provision of services 
to the community is being kept separate 
from the management of the plantation. 
Community services will be provided 
only when the business can afford to; this 
has pushed many PNG businesses into 
bankruptcy. The plantation at Obihaka is 
beginning to be used as a centre for coffee 
extension and farmer training, and has 
the potential to be a centralised coffee-
processing facility and thereby improve 
the quality of the coffee produced by 
surrounding smallholder farmers.
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